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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early years of the American democratic experiment, one of
the foremost observers of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville,
wrote that "the courts correct the aberrations of democracy and ...
though they can never stop the movements of the majority, they do
succeed in checking and directing them."' Tocqueville's writings
resonated greatly at the time, as many states moved towards the popular
election of judges in the name of Jacksonian Democracy.2 Sadly, more
than 170 years after they were first spoken, Tocqueville's words remain
relevant and of vital importance as federal and state courts face
increasingly virulent assaults on their constitutionally-guaranteed
independence. As in the 1830's, these attacks tend to emanate from the
populist cries of elected and appointed members of the legislative and
executive branches of government, with editorial support from segments
of the news media and, in recent years, the newly empowered
blogosphere. Unlike Tocqueville's era, or perhaps any other era in U.S.
history, the rhetoric of the past decade has sparked more frequent
campaigns to remove judges from the bench or to pressure judges to
decide cases according to the whims of the majority, or the most vocal of
the minority, rather than the established and tested law.
In this article, we assert that a subservient judiciary is an affront to
constitutional democracy as we know it, not an expression of the
people's will. We believe it is critical to the health of our democracy for
the lawmakers and the public to understand, in the clearest terms, that the
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
2. See David B. Bogard, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The Lifling of
Judicial Speech Restraint, 26 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 4 (2003).
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judiciary is the final interpreter of the law and a co-equal branch of
government. Delaware can serve as a model for other states-an
illustration of co-equal branches of government, working together to
reach an understanding that sovereignty lies with the people, and that
each branch must play a unique and vital role in guarding that
sovereignty.
We begin our discussion by examining the Separation of Powers
Doctrine as it has developed throughout our nation's history. Next we
discuss how judicial elections politicize the judiciary, minimize the rule
of law, and erase the lines separating the branches of government. We
then offer our view of how best to guarantee the independence of judicial
systems nationwide. Equally as important, we address how to ensure
that the American people understand the independent judiciary's role as
the sine qua non of democracy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Introduction
The judicial branch was established in the federal and state
constitutions as a co-equal branch of government in response to the
oppressive British Crown's manipulation of judges who did not rule as
the king desired, and a British parliament that interpreted the laws it
wrote and passed.3 As the Supreme Court of Delaware said in Evans v.
State,4 "The defining principle of the American constitutional form of
government is separation of powers.... The first state constitutions
reflect the desirability of separating the legislative from the judicial
power, prompted by royal and legislative interference with judgments of
the American colonial courts."5 The American colonists' deep distrust of
governmental authority led to a system of checks and balances in which
each branch has strictly delineated ways to control each other, as well as
strict delegations of power.
Given that judicial independence as we know it had never before
been practiced in Great Britain or elsewhere,6 the state and federal
3. For more extensive treatment of the development of federal judicial
independence and challenges that have arisen throughout U.S. history, see Charles
Gardner Geyh, The Origins and History of Federal Judicial Independence, in AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
documents/indepenjud.pdf.
4. Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005).
5. Id. at 545.
6. See Hillman, infra note 59, at 1300-01 ("The founders of our country ... relied
to a large extent on Montesquieu, who, earlier in the century, was the first modem writer
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judiciary has had to establish itself as a co-equal branch both under the
Constitution and in practice. In 1780, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts adopted a constitution that included in its declaration of
rights the following article:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his
life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial
interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is the right
of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial and
independent as the lot of humanity will admit.7
That same year, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Holmes v. Walton,
became the first court to exercise judicial review by striking down as
unconstitutional a statute permitting six-man juries for persons accused
of trading with the British.
At the federal level, Chief Justice John Marshall first articulated
what it meant to have an independent judiciary under the Separation of
Powers Doctrine in Marbury v. Madison. In words that are as
meaningful today as they were in 1803, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law
and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the
law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence ofjudicial duty.9
In addition to recognizing that the judiciary is the interpreter of the
law, Marshall stressed in Marbury that an affront to the separation of
powers is equally an affront to the fundamental tenets of the
Constitution. He continued:
to recognize the judiciary as an independent branch of government.... He argued, and
the framers of the Constitution agreed, that the preservation of liberty depended on the
three functions being kept separate and independent.").
7. MASS. CONST. art. XXIX. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON THE 21sT CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 1, 6 (2003),
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf
8. See Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables
of Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1601, 1604-05 (2001); see also Wilentz
v. Hendrickson, 38 A.2d 199, 203-04 (N.J. 1944) ("New Jersey was among the very first
of the states of the Union to recognize the right of our courts, with proper regard and
respect for the action of the co-ordinate branches of our government, to strike down
legislation that contravenes the constitution, the fundamental law of our state.").
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
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The Constitution of the United States establishes certain limits not to
be transcended by the different departments of the government. The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between
a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if
those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed,
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is
a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the Constitution by an ordinary act.10
Marshall's words in Marbury have been cited and relied upon as
fundamental tenets of the separation of powers. But inevitably,
challenges have arisen to the separation of powers, as Marshall
established it, throughout the nation's history. One of the more
egregious examples was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "court-
packing" plan in 1937. In an effort to reduce the U.S. Supreme Court's
opposition to social and economic legislation intended to produce jobs
and financial security at the height of the Depression, Roosevelt
threatened to increase the number of Justices and fill the new seats with
more favorable judges (presumably those who already had firm positions
on the New Deal legislation)." Ultimately, Associate Justice Owen
Roberts switched to the majority in cases that upheld New Deal
legislation, thereby mooting Roosevelt's need to pack the court with
ideologues. 12 Today, this incident is relevant to show what can happen
when one branch of government exerts undue pressure on another to
achieve what are essentially political results. Laws that arguably ran
afoul of the Commerce Clause were, nevertheless, upheld to avoid a
Constitutional crisis that threatened separation of powers.,3
10. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added).
11. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REv. 397, 435-
36 (1999) ("Roosevelt, like Lincoln in his moment of desperation, proposed to enlarge
the Court to dilute the influence of the Nine Old Men whose willful resistance threatened
the ability of the Republic to make a serious response to the economic calamity.").
12. Jacob G. Homberger, FDR 's Infamous Court-Packing Scheme, The Future of
Freedom Foundation, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.fff.org/blog/jghblog2009-01-15.asp.
13. Compare U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Justice Roberts sides with the
majority to strike down New Deal legislation as violative of the Commerce Clause) with
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (Justice Roberts inexplicably switched
his position after President Roosevelt leaked his "court packing" scheme and upheld New
Deal legislation with a broader reading of the Commerce Clause in a move now called
"the switch in time that saved nine.").
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In response to Roosevelt's actions, a Pennsylvania attorney and
observer of the Court, Ruby R. Vale, noted in June 1937 that:
Article 3 Section 1 of the Federal Constitution [establishing an
independent judiciary] is the tendon of Achilles of the American
system of government and also may be its safety valve.... It is this
dual legislative and executive power to create the courts and to
determine the number and personnel of the judges that in full
understanding and proper exercise has made a free and independent
judiciary; and figuratively, is the tendon which maintains the
equilibrium of justice and sustains the weight of order as
administered under our dual Federal and State governments. But this
vital tendon is exposed to the possibility that executive dominance
over a subservient Congress may atrophy or cut it, with resultant
collapse of equilibrium and the executive becoming the dominant
authority in government and in its administration ofjustice.14
Vale foresaw the harm that could occur when the branches of
government do not counter-balance or check each other as the
Constitution mandates, regardless of whether they claim to act according
to the people's will. He especially feared the prospect of a king-like
President abusing his Article I powers in order to express his version of
the people's will, while a submissive Congress stood by silent. In
Roosevelt's case, Vale feared that the President would substitute his
"conception" of the Constitution for that of the Supreme Court and seek
to expand the Court, thereby bypassing the public referendum required to
amend the Constitution.15 Vale wrote:
The power that makes the courts can unmake American
representative democracy. If the President can persuade or coerce the
present Congress to accept as truth his unwarranted assumptions and
to enact into law his revolutionary proposals, he will have usurped
the people's prerogative to change the Constitution and can make
himself the supreme power in the Nation.16
President Roosevelt's "court-packing plan" is a textbook example of
the kind of threat to the Constitution that the Founders envisioned and
planned for in outlining the amendment process in Article V." Of
14. Ruby R. Vale, Observations on the Proposals of the President to Change the
Personnel of the Judges, 41 DICK. L. REv. 195, 195 (1937) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 198.
16. Id. at 199.
17. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of
two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which,
in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three
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course, a more fitting ending would have entailed Justice Roberts staying
in the dissent, Roosevelt sending legislation to Congress to expand the
Court's membership, and Congress checking the president's powers by
failing to return the necessary two-thirds vote needed under Article V.
But history, while instructive, does not always provide such perfect
lessons to guide us. As a result, the mistakes of the past are being
repeated today in the form of conflicts between the branches of
government that are shocking not for the differences in opinion that they
spawn-the sign of a healthy democracy-but for the virulence with
which many members of executive and legislative branches at the state
and federal levels are assaulting the constitutionally-guaranteed
independence of the judiciary. The assaults today--often led by highly
visible elected officials with tall soap boxes and deep pockets-are
dangerous in that they are typically the only voices the public hears.
After all, who reads judicial opinions? Absent more balanced voices in
the mainstream, the attacks of public officials can become gospel to a
vulnerable citizen.
B. Roots of the Separation ofPowers Doctrine
The Delaware Supreme Court in Evans18 traced the roots of the
three branches of American government to Aristotle, who studied Greek
city states in his Politics and identified three main government agencies:
the general assembly, public officials, and the judiciary.19 The political
climate of Colonial America was immediately influenced by more
contemporary philosophers, such as Charles Montesquieu,20 Jean Jacques
Rousseau,2' and John Locke,22 who expounded on the importance of
separating the powers of the branches. The influence of those
philosophers is evident in our country's written history and our modern
form of government, and the common thread between these past and
present governments is the Separation of Powers Doctrine. The bridge
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in
the ninth section of the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V.
18. Evans, 872 A.2d at 539.
19. See id. at 543 n.15 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, ch. 14, cited in John A.
Fairlie, The Separation ofPowers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393, 393 (1922)).
20. See id. at 544 (citing BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)).
21. See id (citing Paul M. Spurlin, Rousseau in America, 1 FRENCH-AM, REV. 8-16
(1948)).
22. See id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 221, 254
(T. Peardon ed., 1952)).
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that transformed political philosophy into our modem form of
government, and "elevated the Separation of Powers Doctrine into what
is now known as 'a first principle of free government,'" was the
Declaration of Independence.2 3 The Declaration of Independence
marked the colonists' break from King George III of England.24
Notably, the colonists identified the King's interference with the
authority of the judiciary, as well as deprivation of the benefits of a trial
by jury, as reasons for separating from the Crown.25
The direct result of the colonies' newly claimed independence was
their status as nascent sovereign entities, which brought the need to
establish forms of government. 26 In response, each colonial state drafted
its own constitution.27 The early constitutions, including Delaware's
1776 Constitution, provided for three branches of government:
legislative, executive, and judicial. 28 These state constitutions "reflect
the desirability of separating the legislative from the judicial power,
prompted by royal and legislative interference with the judgments of the
American colonial courts." 2 9
Eventually, the newly formed federal government also needed a
formal framework, and public debate began on how that government
would be organized. The doctrine of separation of powers rose to the
forefront of that discussion.30 Thomas Jefferson emphasized that "'the
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits,
without being effectually checked and restrained by the others."' 3 1
The public discourse on the new federal government was
memorialized in The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay.32 The Federalist Papers, which supported
the proposed federal Constitution, responded to the states' concerns,
including whether the proposed Constitution contained strong
mechanisms for separating the powers of government.3 3
23. Evans, 872 A.2d at 544 (citing PHILADELPHIA NAT'L GAZETTE (Gaillard Hunt
ed., Feb. 6, 1792) (quoting VI JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 91
(1900-1910)); William B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers IX TULANE
STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1965)).
24. See Evans, 872 A.2d at 544.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 545.
28. See id.
29. Evans, 872 A.2d at 545.
30. See id.
31. Id. (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA, 120 (Peden ed., 1954); 3
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Federalist No. 81 addressed that concern by illustrating the
separation of the legislature and judiciary and by explaining that like the
state constitutions, the federal Constitution would prevent the national
legislature from interfering with a "particular case." 34 "'A legislature
without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once
made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future
cases."' 35 In addition, Federalist No. 81 reassured the states that the
Constitution's formulation for separating powers was modeled after
similar provisions in the existing state constitutions, including
Delaware's 1776 Constitution.3 6
Although Delaware's 1776 Constitution was replaced in 1792, when
Delaware adopted a new Constitution, the concept of separating the
powers of government was not lost.37  In fact, it was substantially
strengthened. John Dickinson, who presided over the Delaware
constitutional convention, noted that the 1792 Constitution maintained
the Separation of Powers Doctrine "by keeping [the powers of
government] both 'distinct in department' and 'distinct in office, and yet
connected in operation."' 3 8  Dickinson also observed that "'in a well-
regulated state, judges ought to be equally independent of the executive
and legislative powers."' 39
C. Early Challenges by State Legislatures to the Separation ofPowers
Doctrine
Following ratification of the United States Constitution and the
1792 Delaware Constitution, the state and federal courts were vigilant in
their efforts to protect the province of the court against encroaching
legislatures. Early federal and state court decisions reflect "a consensus
that 'the principle of separation of powers prohibited legislative
interference with the judgments of American courts in specific cases."'40
In Calder v. Bull,41 the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute enacted by the Connecticut legislature,
34. See Evans, 872 A.2d at 546.




38. Id. (quoting THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON (1801); JOHN
DICKINSON, Letters of Fabius, in PAMPHLETS 182-83 (Ford ed., 1788); Jefferson to John
Adams Sept. 28, 1787, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, XII JEFFERSON PAPERS 189 (Boyd ed.);
Lectures on Law, in JAMES WILSON, 1 WORKS OF WILSON 435 (Wilson ed.); In re Request
of the Governor for an Advisory Opinion, 722 A.2d 307 (Del. 1998)).
39. Evans, 872 A.2d at 597.
40. Id. at 547.
41. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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which set aside the final judgment of a state court in a civil case. The
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that the statute was an
42unconstitutional ex post facto law. The case is significant, however, as
a precursor to Marbury v. Madison for its discussion on judicial review
and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Iredell emphasized that "the power to grant, with respect to suits
depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding,
not previously recognized and regulated by positive institutions.. . . The
power . .. is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercised, as in the
present instance, it is an exercise of judicial, not of legislative,
authority."' 4 3
State courts of this era also protected the role of the judiciary. In
Bates v. Kimball,44 the Vermont Supreme Court struck down an act of
the Vermont legislature that authorized a party to appeal from the
judgment of a court even though the time for appeal had expired.45 In
doing so, the Vermont Supreme Court denounced the legislature for
overstepping its authority and stressed the "'necessity of a distinct and
separate existence of the three great departments of government."',4 6
D. The Judiciary's Exclusive Powers as Enunciated in the United
States Constitution and the State Constitution ofDelaware
The United States Constitution "'vests the whole judicial power of
the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as
Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish."' 4 7  The
Delaware Constitution contains a similar provision: "'The judicial
power of this State shall be vested in a Supreme Court ... and such other
courts as from time to time by law [be] established."' 48 The judiciary has
the power to "interpret the law and apply its remedies and penalties in
particular cases."4 9
One of the judiciary's functions is to bring finality to legal
controversies. "The judiciary has 'the power, not merely to rule on cases
but to decide them ... with an understanding, in short, that 'a judgment
conclusively resolves the case' because 'a "judicial power" is one to
42. See id. at 387.
43. Evans, 872 A.2d at 547 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 398) (emphasis added)
44. Bates v. Kimball, 2 D.Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824).
45. See Evans, 872 A.2d at 547.
46. Id. (quoting Bates, 2 D.Chip. 77 at *7).
47. Id. at 548 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173 (1803)).
48. Id. (quoting DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
49. Id. (citing John A Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REV. 393
(1922)).
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render dispositive judgments.'" 5 0 The Delaware Constitution also grants
the courts dispositive power over matters.5' "The Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction . .. to determine finally all matters of appeal on the
judgments and proceedings of said Superior Court in criminal causes."52
If the legislature disagrees with a court decision, its power is limited
to enacting prospective measures.53  Contrary to the beliefs of judicial
independence opponents, 54 the legislature cannot exercise control over
the court by retroactively affecting a decision.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its
own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting aside
their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the
discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be
taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.56
The legislature cannot interfere directly in litigation.5 7 The legislature
"cannot annul, set aside, vacate, reverse, modify, or impair the judgment
of a competent court. It cannot compel the courts to grant new trials,
order the discharge of offenders, or direct what particular steps shall be
taken in a particular judicial proceeding."
III. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC'S
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE
A. Introduction
In the spring of 2005, the Florida Supreme Court declined to
reconsider a trial court's decision to remove Terri Schiavo's feeding
tube. In doing so, the Court declared unconstitutional a Florida state law
ordering reinsertion of the tube, thereby "checking and directing the
majority" in the name of state law and the Florida Constitution, just as
Tocqueville would have expected.59 In Bush v. Schiavo, the Florida
50. Evans, 872 A.2d at 548 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
218-19 (1995)) (emphasis and citations omitted).
51. See id.
52. Id. (quoting DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11).
53. See id.
54. See supra Part III.B.
55. See Evans, 872 A.2d at 547.
56. Id. at 548 (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225).
57. See id. at 549.
58. Id. (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 117 (1963)).
59. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004)); TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
2, at 264.
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Supreme Court resisted calls to turn a case governed by indisputable
facts and Florida's traditionally strict application of the Separation of
Powers Doctrine into a political trophy.60 By its order, the Court sent a
strong message that it would not acquiesce to legislation to placate the
political views of some at the expense of the rule of law. Simply stated,
the Court told all who were listening (at the time, the entire nation) that it
would uphold its role as the independent arbiter of the law.6 1
Negative responses to the Florida Supreme Court's carefully crafted
opinion in Schiavo ranged from the predictably political (albeit factually
absurd) to the threatening. Former United States Senator Rick Santorum
(R-PA) derided the courts' actions as "unconscionable."62 He told
reporters "[this is] routinely done by the courts-deciding they are now a
super-legislature. I'm not sure if the press realizes how serious this
conflict is between the branches of government and how gravely
concerned members of Congress are with [the] kinds of judicial tyranny
we've seen."63 Not to be upstaged, former United States Representative
Tom DeLay (R-TX) vowed that "[t]he time will come for the men
responsible for this to answer for their behavior."
The well-orchestrated media campaign that followed the Santorum
and DeLay attacks on the Florida Supreme Court added fuel to the fire
that was meant to weaken the independence of the judiciary. The Florida
Supreme Court held firm as the attacks grew in number and ferocity.
Santorum, DeLay, and many of their contemporaries-of all political and
ideological stripes-were right about one thing: conflicts between the
three branches of government had risen to heights that exceeded even the
"aberrations" that Tocqueville foresaw and that the country had
experienced in its brief history. 65 At the heart of this conflict and what
has long plagued our government and country, is a fundamental
misunderstanding of the Separation of Powers Doctrine as it was created
by our Founding Fathers and as it has developed through over two
hundred years of trial, tribulation, and threat.
60. See Bush, supra note 59, at 330.
61. See id. at 330-31.
62. Liza Porteus, GOP Goes on Judicial Offensive, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 1, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933, I52095,00.html.
63. Id.
64. Id. Unfortunately, veiled threats of violence against the judiciary are not new.
For instance, Texas Senator John Cornyn has suggested that "'there may be some
connection between the perception in some quarters, on some occasions, where judges
are making political decisions yet are unaccountable to the public, that builds up and
builds up and builds up to the point where some people engage in violence."' Todd
David Peterson, Oh, Behave!, LEGAL AFF. 16 (Nov./Dec. 2005).
65. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (George Lawrence,
trans., J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner, eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
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As a people living under dual sovereigns, we also live under two
constitutions which, depending on one's state of residence, may provide
for the separation of powers in varying degrees. At the same time, we all
must understand that without an effective system of checks and balances
between the branches of government, these branches will assume powers
never intended for them. A branch of government that usurps power
from other branches does so for its own benefit, not in the name of the
voting public. As Douglas W. Hillman, a former judge in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, wrote,
"[G]overnment has a way of increasing its power at the expense of its
citizens, often in incremental steps. Consequently, it is crucial that one
truly independent institution be able to curb that ever creeping
enlargement of power."6 6
B. The Separation ofPowers Today: Assault and Retreat
Today, the breakdown of the separation of powers is marked by
elected and appointed officials who assault judges with Tom
DeLay-esque statements that judges will have to "answer for their
behavior" or look over their shoulders when rendering future opinions.67
Those firing the warning shots toward judges typically retreat to the
safety of statements that their words were taken out of context or that
they were simply responding to "judicial activism"68 in the name of their
constituents. The harm, however, is already done to a public that relies
on its elected officials and news sources to inform them of the facts. In
some instances, judges are subjected to retention elections in which they
66. Douglas W. Hillman, Judicial Independence: Linchpin of Our Constitutional
Democracy, 76 MICH. Bus. L.J. 1300, 1301 (1997).
67. Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of the Courts, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2005, at A9, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19793-2005
Aprl.html; Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial
Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38
AKRON L. REV. 597, 604 (2005) (quoting Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do
Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 123, 140 (1999)).
68. "A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal
views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, [usually] with
the suggestion that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and
are willing to ignore precedent." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999). See also
Adam Cohen, Psst ... Justice Scalia ... You Know, You're an Activist Judge, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Editorials/Op-Ed, Apr. 19, 2005,http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/opinion/19
tue3.html?ex=1271563200&en=aff420b604578872&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc
-rss ("When it comes to judicial activism, conservative judges are no better than liberal
ones-and, it must be said, no worse. If conservatives are going to continue their war on
the judiciary, though, they should be honest. They do not want to get rid of judicial
activists, a standard that would bring down even Justice Scalia. They want to rid the
courts ofjudges who disagree with them.").
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cannot respond effectively to their critics, often because they are bound
by the Judicial Code of Ethics, and cannot reveal how they would decide
future controversies. Some judges respond to these threats by adjusting
their views of the law, while others stay silent in accordance with their
duty to speak primarily through their court opinions, rather than through
their campaigns as politicians.
Former Justice Joseph T. Walsh of the Delaware Supreme Court
wrote in 1999:
In recent times ... the functioning of the judiciary, particularly the
conduct of individual judges in high-profile cases, has been subject to
close public scrutiny, often accompanied by strident criticism in the
news media and by public officials.... [I]n an age of instantaneous
communication, criticism of the conduct of individual judges quickly
becomes an institutional indictment. In states where judges are
elected, public perception can even result in terminating the career of
incumbent judges.69
Justice Walsh may have had former Tennessee Supreme Court
Justice Penny White in mind when he wrote the above statement. Justice
White, a 1995 appointee to the five-member Tennessee Supreme Court,
joined the majority in a June 1996 capital case that affirmed the court of
appeal's reversal of a death sentence.70 In State of Tennessee v. Odom,71
the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the defendant received a fair
trial, and it affirmed the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder
and aggravated rape.72 The Court found reversible error, however, in the
lower court's reliance upon the jury's finding that the murder was
committed under aggravating circumstances (because the murder was
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and committed during an escape from
lawful custody), and in the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to
present certain mitigating evidence.7 3 The Tennessee Supreme Court
vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing,
explaining that, "we find the errors found therein involve substantial
rights and more probably than not affected the sentencing judgment or
would result in prejudice to the judicial process."7 4
69. Joseph T. Walsh, Judicial Independence: A Delaware Perspective, 2 DEL. L.
REv. 1, 16 (1999).
70. See Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial
Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38
AKRON L. REv. 597, 603 (2005).
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Two months after the three to two decision in Odom, Justice White
(and Justice White, alone) was subjected to a contested retention
election.75  In Tennessee, a nominating commission appoints state
supreme court justices, who must stand for reelection in the next biennial
general election and retention election every eight years thereafter.76
White was given two months to campaign, and she faced opposition from
a special interest group and the governor of Tennessee, who denounced
White as "soft on the death penalty and weak on victim rights."7 As a
result, White lost her retention election, fifty-five to forty-five percent.
Voter turnout was eighteen percent.7 9 In the days following White's
removal from the bench, the governor proclaimed, "Should a judge look
over his shoulder to the next election in determining how to rule on a
case? I hope so. I hope so."so
Justice White's retention debacle is a prime example of the kind of
single case-driven witch hunt to which judges should never be subjected.
While the Tennessee governor could assault White's record without
revealing specifics and then retreat to the safety of "tough on crime" and
"victims rights" sound bites, White, constrained by judicial ethics and
without a campaign war chest, was unable to defend herself.8 ' There was
nothing democratic about Justice White's retention vote. As Washington
Post reporter Joel Achenbach wrote two years before White was
removed from the bench, "I think ... that democracy is a poor name for
a system in which voters routinely vote for people they know nothing
about." 82
75. See Kotey, supra note 70, at 603.
76. See id.
77. Id. Justice White was opposed by Tennessee Senators, the Governor, and the
Republican party, which sent a mailing to 2500 party leaders, encouraging them to reject
Justice White's "liberal record" in criminal cases. John D. Fabian, The Paradox of
Elected Judges: Tension in the American Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155,
156-57 (Fall, 2001).
78. See Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges:
Popular Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 313, 316
(Winter, 1998).
79. Id.
80. See Kotey, supra note 70, at 604.
81. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks On The Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
Amid Efforts To Intimidate And Remove Judges From Office For Unpopular Decisions?,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 314 (1997).
82. Joel Achenbach, Selection and Retention ofJudges: Is Florida's Present System
Still the Best Compromise?: Why Reporters Love Judicial Elections, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
155, 158 (1994). Achenbach sarcastically explained his affinity for judicial elections: "I
like judicial elections. Indeed, I cherish judicial elections. This is because I am a
newspaper reporter, and newspaper reporters love anything farcical, funny, structurally
absurd, or silly." Id. at 155.
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A more recent example of this brand of single-case driven
histrionics by lawmakers and the media is the firestorm that erupted
when a district court judge in Montpelier, Vermont, Judge Edward
Cashman, suspended a convicted sex-offender's ten-year prison sentence
for sixty days.83 In that case, the Vermont Commissioner of Corrections
classified the defendant as one who was less likely than other sex
offenders to commit another crime.84 The Commissioner decided that
the defendant would not, however, receive any treatment while he was in
prison. As a result, Judge Cashman was forced to choose between two
imperfect sentences: a long prison term with no rehabilitation for the
offender, or a short prison term followed by sex offender rehabilitation
and probation for life.86 Judge Cashman, a former prosecutor known for
tough sentencing in his nearly twenty-five years on the bench, handed
down the sixty-day sentence to guarantee that the defendant "would get
into sex offender rehabilitation quickly or face a possible life sentence."
According to the judge, he chose the option that would best serve
society: rehabilitation of the offender, rather than punishment alone.88
The media misconstrued Judge Cashman's remarks at the sentencing
hearing, concluding that he no longer believed in punishment.89 The
transcript clearly demonstrates that Judge Cashman actually stated that
"punishment is not enough," indicating that treatment in addition to
punishment was the appropriate course. 90
In response to Judge Cashman's judgment call, some Vermont
lawmakers called for his resignation. 91  Although legislators voted
Cashman into a new six-year term in 2001 by a margin of 137-15,92 some
wanted to subject the judge to a retention election a year earlier than his
regularly scheduled 2007 review by the state legislature's Judicial
Retention Committee. After co-sponsoring the resolution in the
legislature calling on Judge Cashman to resign, Representative Duncan
83. See Louis Porter, Judge Defends Sex Sentence Amid Firestorm, RUTLAND





87. See Brian Joyce, Sex Offender Sentence Criticized, 3 WCAX-TV NEWS, Jan. 5,
2006,http://www.wcax.c om/global/story.asp?s-4325804&ClientType=Printable.
88. See Porter, supra note 83.
89. See e.g., Lisa Rathke, Judge Steadfast About Sex Offender Case, ABCNEWS,
Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Novl3/0,4670,JudgeSexualAssault,
00.html.
90. Id.
91. See Joyce, supra note 87.
92. See FoxNews.com, Light Sentence for Child Molester Leaves Vermont Judge
Under Fire, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,181498,00.html.
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Kilmartin said, "It's time to stop allowing judges in general . . . to hide
behind the claim that the sentence has to protect society and not the
individual victim."93  Meanwhile, Fox News columnist John Gibson
wrote the following in his column titled "Moronic Judges":
Let's see if there's a sudden change in the faces wearing black robes
in Vermont. See if people wake up and notice who's down at the
courthouse playing judge this week. Is it somebody who doesn't
believe in jail? I would think that's a basic question when you're
considering who should be a judge.94
The controversy quieted, and the calls for an early retention election
ceased after Judge Cashman increased the defendant's controversial
sentence from 60 days to a term of three to ten years in jail.95 Judge
Cashman's decision to revisit the sentence was prompted by a decision
by the Vermont Human Services Secretary, which ordered the
Department of Corrections to change its policy regarding low-risk sex
offenders and eligibility for treatment in jail.96 After the defendant's
sentence was increased, the resolution demanding Judge Cashman's
resignation was amended, and any references to him were removed. 97
Ironically (and laughably), the amended resolution included a provision
"that the General Assembly 'recognizes the importance of an
independent judiciary to the rule of law in our constitutional system of
government."' 9 8
In September 2006, Judge Cashman announced his retirement from
the bench.99 Judge Cashman officially stepped down in April 2007 when
his term expired and when he would have been subject to a retention
election. 00
93. See Porter, supra note 83. Acknowledging that Judge Cashman's sentence did
not violate a sentencing guideline or statute, the resolution cited as one of the bases for
the call for Judge Cashman's resignation that "Judge Cashman . . . declared that after 25
years, he no longer believes in punishment." J.R.H. Res. 52, 2005-2006 Leg. Sess. (Vt.
2006) available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2006/
resolutn/JRHO52.HTM.
94. See John Gibson, Moronic Judges, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 6, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933, 180915,00.html.
95. See Judge Adds Years to 60-Day Term for Molester, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan.
27, 2006, at 5.
96. See Judge Increases Molester's Sentence, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Jan.
27, 2006, at 12A.
97. See A Review of State Legislation Affecting the Courts, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Nat'l.
Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), Jan. 25, 2007.
98. Id.
99. See Vermont Judge Blasted for Short Sex-Offender Sentence to Retire,
FOXNEWS.coM, http://www.foxn ews.com/story/0,2933,211679,00.html.
100. See id. Judge Cashman did not cite the controversial sentence as the impetus for
his retirement but cited his age and family issues.
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Both the Penny White and Edward Cashman incidents involved
respected judges who, ironically enough, would objectively be
considered "tough on crime" based on the totality of their records.'
Neither judge was able to effectively mount a response to
unsubstantiated accusations of judicial activism and, in White's case,
furious and highly organized efforts to kick the judge off the bench. The
common thread in these cases is a breakdown in the separation of powers
to the extent that judges are pressured to do what is popular and result-
oriented, rather than what is just and process-oriented-the duty of a
judge as a member of an independent judiciary.
C. The High Price ofJudicial Elections
In jurisdictions where judicial candidates are elected rather than
nominated, judicial independence is eroding. By participating in the
campaign process, judicial candidates must "sell themselves" to garner
the votes and financial support needed to win elections. Inevitably, the
lines between judge and politician blur, and, in many cases, it seems that
political debts acquired on the campaign trail are having a deleterious
effect on court decisions and the public perception of judge.
The cost of judicial elections is high, not just in terms of money, but
more importantly, in terms of the cost to society-the loss of a truly
independent judiciary and the loss of public confidence. A successful
bid for office depends in large part on a candidate's ability to solicit large
donations from wealthy, influential contributors. 10 2 All too often those
contributors are lawyers who will appear frequently before that judge, or
litigants in cases presided over by that judge. There can be little question
that conflicts of interest arise when contributors litigate before the judge
whose campaign they funded. What effect does this political
indebtedness have on a successful candidate's ability to remain impartial
on the bench? What effect does it have on the public's perception of the
independence, impartiality and fairness of the judge?
Such questions surfaced in the 2004 contest for a seat on the Illinois
Supreme Court. In that race, then-Circuit Judge Lloyd Karmeier and his
opponent, Illinois Appellate Judge Gordon Maag, set a national
fundraising record for a single state Supreme Court campaign.10 3
Together, the two candidates raised over $9.3 million in campaign funds,
101. See Christopher Graff, Cashman Best Known for Pro-Law Stands, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060112/NEWS/60112001/100
2.
102. See James Sample, The Campaign Trial: The True Cost of Expensive Court
Seats, SLATE, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137529.
103. See id.
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far exceeding the previous national record of $4.9 million set in Alabama
in 2000.104 Karmeier received $350,000 in campaign contributions from
employees, lawyers, and representatives of the insurance company State
Farm.105 At the time of the campaign, State Farm had an appeal pending
before the Supreme Court of Illinois seeking the reversal of a $1 billion
trial court verdict, including $456 million in contractual claims.106
Karmeier also received an additional $1 million from State Farm
affiliates.10 7 Regarding the exorbitant campaign donations he received,
Karmeier stated, "[T]hat's obscene for a judicial race. What does it gain
people? How can people have faith in the system?"' 08 Karmeier won the
election.
Remarkably, shortly after taking the bench, and despite the
campaign money he took from State Farm, Justice Karmeier refused to
recuse himself from hearing the State Farm appeal. 09 He voted to
overturn the lower court's $456 million award for contractual damages
against State Farm."l0 Commenting on Karmeier's decision, an editorial
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch stated, "Although Mr. Karmeier is an
intelligent and no doubt honest man, the manner of his election will cast
doubt over every vote he casts in a business case."'
A high profile case in West Virginia illustrates the conflicts of
interest produced by corporate campaign donations. In November 2007,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed a $50 million jury
verdict against the country's fourth largest coal company, Massey
Energy.11 2 In that case, Chief Justice Elliot Maynard voted in the 3-2
majority decision to overturn the verdict against Massey Energy."13
Shortly thereafter, pictures surfaced of Chief Justice Maynard
vacationing on the French Riviera with the CEO of Massey Energy, Don
Blankenship.114 The pictures were taken in the summer of 2006, while
104. See JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN
THE GREAT LAKE STATES, 2000-2008 12 (2008), available at http://www.mcfn.org/pdfs/
reports/NPJEGreatLakes_2000-2008.FINAL.pdf.
105. See Sample, supra note 102.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Ryan Keith, Republican Lloyd Karmeier Wins Supreme Court Seat, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, available at http://www.illinoisyr.com/detail content.asp?id=197.
109. See Sample, supra note 102
110. See id.
111. James Sample, Op-Ed., Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2008, at A24,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120614225489456227.html?mod=opinion
main commentaries.
112. See Justice at Stake Campaign, Caperton v. Massey Resource Page,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/node/ 107 (last visited July 21, 2009).
113. Id.
114. Sample, supra note 111, at A24.
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Massey's appeal was pending before the court."'5 The pictures spurred
charges of impropriety, prompting the court to rehear the case. Maynard
recused himself from participating in the rehearing." 6  Justice Larry
Starcher also recused himself.'" 7  Although Starcher voted against
overturning the verdict against Massey, he stated that his public
criticisms of Blankenship could create the appearance of bias." 8
Starcher furthermore demanded that his colleague Justice Brent
Benjamin recuse himself as well, since Benjamin had received over $3
million in campaign contributions from Blankenship during his 2004
campaign." 9 Justice Benjamin, who earlier voted with the majority to
overturn the verdict against Massey Energy, refused to recuse himself.120
Outraged, Justice Starcher wrote, "Just think about it-$4 million! I
know hardly a soul who could believe that a justice who benefited to this
extent from a litigant could rule fairly on cases involving that litigant or
his companies."'21
In April 2008, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again
reversed the jury verdict against Massey Energy, and again Justice
Benjamin voted in favor of Massey Energy.122 Three months later, the
plaintiff Harman Mining Co. filed an appeal with the United States
Supreme Court asking the Court to consider whether Justice Benjamin
should have recused himself from presiding over Massey's appeal.12 3
In June 2009, the United States Supreme Court issued a 5-4 opinion
reversing the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on
the ground that Justice Benjamin should have recused himself from
hearing Massey's appeal.12 4 Although the Court did not find that Justice
Benjamin was actually biased by Blankenship's large campaign
contributions, it found that "there was a serious, objective risk of actual





119. Sample, supra note 111, at A24.
120. Id.
121. Editorial, Bravo: Starcher, Maynard acts, THE CHARLESTON GAzETrE, Feb. 16,
2008, http://wvgazette.c om/Opinion/Editorials/200802150735.
122. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3,
2008).
123. See Cecelia Mason and Scott Finn, Plaintiff Speaks Out in Caperton v. Massey
Supreme Court Case, West Virginia Public Broadcasting, Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.wvpubcast.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=8407.
124. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009). Justice
Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief Judge Roberts issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, and Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion.
125. See Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2256.
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held that Due Process requires judges to recuse themselves when the
circumstances of a case create a "probability of bias." 2 6 The Court's
decision states, in part,
[t]here is a serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and
reasonable perceptions-when a person with a personal stake in a
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.127
In applying this analysis, the Court found that "Blankenship's campaign
efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice
Benjamin on the case." 2 8  Although the four dissenting justices
challenged the workability of the Court's new "probability of bias"
standard, 12 9 it is clear that the Court's majority decision and its
application to the circumstances presented in the Massey case is an
enormous step forward on the path to restoring the public's confidence in
an independent judiciary. "This is a major victory for the rule of law,"
stated James Sample, Counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice. "The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the fundamental principle that money
should not influence the courts, and that justice should not be for sale." 3 0
These are but two examples. The inherent conflicts of interest that
exist when judges preside over cases involving litigants that financed
their elections are undeniable. Even if the judge's decision is not
financially motivated, there exists an overwhelming appearance of quid
pro quo, which undermines the public's confidence in the judiciary. As
the Supreme Court acknowledged in the Massey case, it ultimately does
not matter whether bias in judicial decision-making is real or perceived.
The appearance of impropriety is sufficient to perpetuate the public's
perception that "justice is for sale on some clearance rack parked behind
the courthouse."' 3'
IV. CURRENT EFFORTS TO REPEL (AND REDUCE) ATTACKS ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Discussions enumerating the threats to judicial independence
abound; solutions, however, are elusive. After the dust settles, one thing
126. See id.
127. Id. at 2255.
128. Id. at 2264.
129. Id. at 2256-75.
130. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Supreme
Court Reverses Decision in Caperton v. Massey, June 8, 2009, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009 /06/08-4.
131. John Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, available at
http://abajournal.com/magazine/capertons-coal/.
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is clear-the real battle is the fight over public opinion. The forces on
the other side have successfully engaged the media to their advantage,
often distorting and exploiting issues to advance their purpose. As
members of the bench and bar, we spread the message and educate the
public that judicial independence is essential to maintain the rule of law.
We must make them understand that "judicial independence is not
conferred so judges can do as they please. Judicial independence is
conferred so judges can do as they must."l 32
Fortunately, some efforts are underway to educate the public about
the threats to judicial independence and to combat those threats. Several
groups have established task forces to promote an independent judiciary,
including the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial
Independence,' 33 the American Bar Association's Least Understood
Branch, 13 4 and Justice At Stake, a non-partisan coalition "working to
keep courts fair and impartial."' 35  These groups offer many
approaches-from education, with Law Day as the notable success story,
to public relations rapid response teams.' 36 These teams, composed of
members of local bar associations, are organized and prepared to address
controversial court decisions, and they use the media to educate the
public.137 Some believe that judges should do more public speaking, not
about specific cases, but about the role of the judiciary in general. 3 8 All
of these suggestions have been met with varying degrees of acceptance
and controversy, and no one proposal has been identified as the silver
bullet. 3 9 Reactive solutions are one approach, but we must not lose sight
of the major underlying cause of these attacks on judicial independence.
132. Judicial Security and Independence: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110' Cong. (2007) (testimony of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy), available at
www.uscourts.gov/testimony/JusticeKennedy021407.pdf.
133. American Judicature Society, Judicial Independence Home Page,
http://www.ajs.org/cji/default.asp (last visited July 21, 2009).
134. American Bar Association, ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence,
http://www.abanet.org/judind/home.html (last visited July 21, 2009).
135. Justice at Stake, About Justice at Stake, http://www.justiceatstake.org/node/12
(last visited July 21, 2009).
136. See generally ABA COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, RAPID RESPONSE TO
UNFAIR AND UNJUST CRITICISM OF JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judind/toolkit/impartialcourts/RapidResponse Pamphlet.pdf (providing guidelines for
the establishment of public relations programs).
137. See id.
138. See ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21s CENTURY JUDICIARY (July 2003),
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf; C.J. Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Judicial Independence as a Campaign Platform, WASH. ST. B. ASS'N (2005),
http://www.wsba.org/medialpublications/bamews/2005/mar-05-abrahamson.htm.
139. See Jan Pudow, Kennedy: Our Judiciary is the Envy of the World, 33 FLA. B.
NEWS 7 (July 15, 2005), available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4523987/
Kennedy-our-judiciary-is-the.html.
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A. Election ofJudges is a Major Underlying Cause ofAttacks on
Judicial Independence
At the state court level, as evidenced by the events in the Schiavo,
Penny White, and Edward Cashman incidents, the root cause of the
problem is the manner in which some state judges are selected and the
length of their terms. "Over 80% of state trial and appellate judges are
elected by the people, and most state judges have limited terms, some as
little as four years." 4 0  The first line of defense in maintaining an
independent judiciary is to insulate the judicial officers from a political
selection process. A system that appoints rather than elects members of
the judiciary, similar to the federal system, is optimal. States should also
consider modeling their judicial selection process after the Delaware
system, which not only appoints judges, but also ensures that the bench is
politically balanced.141 This approach can only enhance the public's
perception (and the reality) that the Court is politically neutral.
Of course, appointed judges, just like elected judges, are subject to
criticism and may face retribution for unpopular decisions. But in the
case of appointed judges, the "retribution" is the impeachment process
set forth in the Constitution.14 2  Given the rise in attacks on judicial
independence, it is not surprising that there has been a significant
increase in recent years in impeachment proceedings.14 3 In our nation's
history, "only 13 federal judges have been faced with articles of
impeachment, and only seven have been convicted and removed from
office. Three of those seven convictions and removals have taken place
in the last 20 years." 4 4 Not surprisingly, the climate for state judges
(most of whom are elected)145 is worse than that for federal judges (all of
140. C.J. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9 (2003) (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS: PART
Two 3 n.1 (1998); Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial Independence and
Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 154-55 (1998)).
141. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
142. "[A]II civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
143. See Judicial Impeachment: History and Current Trends, JUSTICE AT STAKE, Sept.
18, 2006, http://www.faircourts.org/default.asp (follow "Press Room" hyperlink; then
follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "9/18/06" hyperlink).
144. Id.
145. Over 87 percent of state judges are either elected or subject to retention
elections. Judicial Impeachment: History and Current Trends, JUSTICE AT STAKE, Sept.
18, 2006, http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=7,55,890. We
believe the politics involved in state judiciary selection process contributes to the
disparity in the number of impeachment proceedings initiated against state judges versus
federal judges.
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whom are appointed), with 48 documented impeachment threats from
2001-2005, which is almost double the rate from the previous four-year
period. 14 6  "The most frequently cited issues involve decisions on
criminal sentencing, education, abortion, and gay and lesbian legal
issues."1 4 7
A perfect example is the recent statement by an opponent of gay
marriage in response to the California Supreme Court decision 4 8
allowing homosexuals to marry in California. James Dobson, chairman
of Focus on the Family, announced that the California Supreme Court
Justices had "arrogantly" declared the will of the people null and void.14 9
Other opponents of the ruling indicated that the decision would make
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ron George, who is up for
reelection in 2010, the "chief target of California voters.",s This and
similar attacks levied at judges for doing their jobs, i.e. construing the
law, damage the public trust in the judiciary, inflame an already
incendiary issue, and distract the public from the real issues and
productive debate on the merits.
Another troubling example of an assault on judicial independence is
the attack on the justices in the majority in Kennedy v. Louisiana.5'
Opponents of the majority decision striking down the death penalty in a
vicious child rape case found it to be "appalling" and "terribly
flawed." 52 Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal said that "[t]he opinion
reads more like an out-of-control legislative debate than a constitutional
analysis."' 53 Justice Kennedy, the author of the decision, was the object
of most of the critics, some of whom have even called for his
impeachment. 1 54 One journalist wrote, "The intellectual backflips Justice
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
149. See Devon Williams, California Rules in Favor of Same-Sex "Marriage"; Dr.
Dobson Outraged, CITIZENLINK.COM, May 15, 2008, http://www.citizenlink.org/
content/A000007441.cfn.
150. Campaign for Children and Families, California Pro-Family Response to State
Supreme Court Ordering Homosexual "Marriage" Legalization, SAVECALIFORNIA.COM,
May 15, 2008, http://savecalifomia.com/ca-release-05-15-08-califomia-pro-family.html.
151. 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
152. Matthew Continetti, An Indecent Decision, WKLY STANDARD, July 7, 2008,
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/269
gzinz.asp.
153. BayouBuzz.com, Louisiana Gov. Jindal Outraged Over Child Rape Case, June
25, 2008, http://www.bayoubuzz.com/News/Louisiana/Politics/LouisianaGov._Jindal
OutragedOverChildRapeCase_6661.asp.
154. See e.g., Posting of Greg to http://rhymeswithright.mu.nularchives/267386.php
(June 25, 2008, 02:26 EST).
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Kennedy performed in his opinion would be impressive if they weren't
so offensive to constitutionalist sensibilities."'
In Kennedy, the Supreme Court Justices in the majority rendered a
very unpopular decision, no question. As Justice Kennedy
acknowledged, the rape "was one that cannot be recounted in these pages
in a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on [the]
victim or to convey the revulsion society, and the jury that represents it,
sought to express by sentencing petitioner to death."' 5 6 People can and
will vocalize their disagreement with this decision. 157
We certainly do not suggest that it is improper to criticize judicial
decisions. "To the contrary, [such criticism] is a healthy sign for
democracy that the public is engaged with the workings of the judicial
system."158 Judges make mistakes. They err. If they err on the law or
facts, the appellate process enables those aggrieved by that error to have
it corrected. If they err by engaging in wrongful conduct, they are
subject to discipline or impeachment. As Justice O'Connor reminds us,
no one is above the law and "members of the judiciary cannot sincerely
believe that they should be regarded as above the very laws they are
charged with interpreting."1 5 9 The problem is when criticism "cross[es]
over into intimidation."' 60
Fortunately, in Delaware, threats to judicial independence are not as
plentiful or virulent as those in other parts of the country. We believe
this is attributable, in large part, to our judicial selection process and the
unique atmosphere our small geographical stature creates.
B. "The Delaware Way"
Thomas Jefferson characterized Delaware as a "jewel among
states."' 6 ' We believe this to be true in many respects, not the least of
which is the effective working relationship, collegiality and respect
155. Matthew Continetti, An Indecent Decision, WKLY STANDARD (July 7, 2008),
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/269
gzinz.asp.
156. Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2646.
157. As Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court noted: "We know
that almost from their creation, the courts have been criticized for their judgments. That
is a part of life in a democracy. It is a rare court decision that does not displease
someone." C.J. Thomas Moyer, Address at the Columbus Metropolitan Club (June 28,
2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/toolkit/impartialcourts/metropolitan
club.pdf.
158. J. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id= 110009019.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Delaware, available at https://edit.britannica.com/
getEditableToc?tocld=9 273954.
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between the branches of government. Unlike many other states, in
Delaware the lines of communication between the branches of
government are open, and open wide. This open communication is
largely due to our small size. There is no question that the ease of
communication and the long-standing cooperation between the branches
unquestionably improves the functioning of each branch. For example, it
is not unusual for legislators to solicit the Attorney General's input
before proposing legislation that which would affect criminal penalties or
establish new crimes. With regard to proposed legislation affecting
penalties, the legislature might also solicit input from the Department of
Corrections and/or the judicial branch. Communication flows in more
than one direction, too. The Delaware judiciary invites members of the
legislature to visit the courts and attend educational programs.1 62 The
three branches of government in Delaware frequently participate in joint
projects, such as the Three-Branch Personnel System Reform Task
Force. 163 According to our former Chief Justice, E. Norman Veasey, this
interbranch cooperation is directly attributable to the "intelligence,
approachability, and integrity" of Delaware public officials.164  And,
according to Delaware Supreme Court Justice Henry DuPont Ridgely:
There is really a constancy of purpose here. We are committed to
doing what is necessary to have the best state court system in the
United States. I hasten to add that it is not merely the judiciary which
is committed to this effort. This is a collaborative undertaking and
involves the judges and their staff people, the members of the
Delaware Bar, the General Assembly and the Governor.165
At home and nationally, the Delaware judiciary commands respect.
"All three branches of government in Delaware are keenly aware of the
reputation of the judicial branch of government and of the enormous
contribution that the judicial branch makes to Delaware's economy and
to the well-being of our citizens." 66  The judiciary is nationally
recognized for its excellence, not controversy.16 7




164. C.J. E. Norman Veasey, IHave the Best Job in America, 13 DELAWARE LAWYER
20 (Winter 1995).
165. Delaware Courts Still at the Top: A Constancy of Purpose, 11 METRO. CORP.
CouNs. 55 (Nov. 2003) (Interview of The Hon. Henry DuPont Ridgely, former President
Judge, Superior Court of Delaware and current Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware).
166. Veasey, supra note 162.
167. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007: RATING THE STATES
(2007), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.comlawsuitclimate2007/pdf/
ClimateReport.pdf [hereinafter LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007].
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C. Replace Elections with the Delaware Model ofJudicial
Appointment
1. The Delaware Judicial Appointment Process Strikes a Balance
that Has Proved to be Effective
Delaware judges are appointed, not elected. Article IV of the
Delaware Constitution provides that judicial officers of the Supreme
Court, Court of Chancery, Superior Court, Family Court, and the Court
of Common Pleas "shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the
consent of a majority of all the members elected to the Senate, for the
term of 12 years each."168 In order to ensure that the courts are fair and
impartial, the Delaware system goes one step further and requires that the
courts be politically balanced. 16 9 The courts must have an equal number
of members from each of the major political parties.170 A court with an
odd number of members must not have "more than a bare majority ... of
the same major political party." 7 1
The Governor's choice for the judicial nominee is selected from a
list submitted by the Judicial Nominating Commission.17 2  The
Commission reviews all of the applicants for the open position and
selects at least three individuals for submission to the Governor.173 The
stated purpose of the Commission is to select
men and women of the highest caliber, who by intellect, work ethic,
temperament, integrity and ability demonstrate the capacity and
commitment to sensibly, intelligibly, promptly, impartially, and
independently interpret the laws and administer justice. The
Commission shall seek the best qualified persons available at the time
for the particular vacancy at issue.174
The Commission itself is a testament to the Delaware's
''commitment to a bipartisan judiciary composed of judges of high




172. See Exec. Order No. 4 (Mar. 27, 2009) (Gov. Markell), http://governor.
delaware.gov/orders/exec order_4.shtml. See also Guy v. Judicial Nominating Com'n,
659 A.2d 777, 779 (Del. Super. 1995) ("The Judicial Nominating Commission was first
established by Governor Pierre S. du Pont, IV, pursuant to Executive Order No. 4 ,
approved on February 24, 1977. His successor, Governor Michael N. Castle, continued
the Commission pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, approved on February 21, 1985.
Governor Castle preceded Governor Carper in office.").
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integrity, independence and excellent legal abilities."' 7 ' Like the
composition of the judiciary, the Commission is politically balanced.17 6
The Commission is composed of nine members, eight of which are
appointed by the Governor. 7 7  No more than five of the Governor's
appointees can be from the same political party.17 8 The ninth member of
the Commission is appointed by the President of the Delaware State Bar
Association.' 79 The Commission is not only politically balanced but also
strikes a balance between members of the Delaware Bar and the citizenry
of the State of Delaware. The Governor's appointees are composed
equally of "distinguished attorneys and laypersons." 8 0  The Delaware
judicial nominating process goes to great pains to ensure a balanced and
independent judiciary, and, therefore, it is no surprise that the public
perceives Delaware courts as fair arbiters of justice.'8 '
2. Delaware Judicial Canons Ensure the Integrity of the Judiciary
"A judge should uphold the integrity, independence and impartiality
of the judiciary." So states Canon 1 of the Delaware Judges' Code of
Judicial Conduct which was adopted in 1993.182 The Comment to Canon
1 states:
Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon
public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. The
integrity and independence of judges depends in turn upon their
acting without fear or favor. Although judges should be independent,
they should comply with the law, as well as the provisions of this
Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is
maintained by the adherence of each judge to this responsibility.
Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence in
the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government
under law.
The Canons are rules of reason. They should be applied consistently
with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and




178. See Exec. Order No. 4, supra note 173.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007, supra note 167, at 3.
182. DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. [hereinafter CODE].
The Code consists of four canons and is set forth with commentary in Appendix A.
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Code is to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential
independence ofjudges in making judicial decisions. 83
The Code is strict, and strictly enforced by the Delaware "Court on
the Judiciary."l 8 4 Any Delaware judicial officer "may be censured or
removed" by the Court on the Judiciary for violating the Code:
A judicial officer may be censured or removed ... for willful
misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform his or
her duties, the commission after appointment of an offense involving
moral turpitude, or other persistent misconduct in violation of the
canons of Judicial Ethics as adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court
from time to time. 185
The Court on the Judiciary is comprised of the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Chancellor of
Chancery Court, the President Judge of Superior Court, the Chief Judge
of Court of the Common Pleas, and the Chief Judge of Family Court.186
The Court on the Judiciary need not be unanimous to censure or remove
a sitting judge for misconduct; only the "affirmative concurrence of two-
thirds of the members" is necessary.187
The Code is not the only mechanism in place in Delaware to
preserve and ensure "an independent and honorable judiciary."'8 8  In
1994, the Court on the Judiciary created a committee of judges and
lawyers to render advisory opinions on proper judicial conduct with
respect to the Code.'8 9  If a judge has a question or concern about
whether he or she can engage in a certain activity, the judge may request
an opinion from the Committee. This resource is frequently utilized and
has pre-empted many potential Code violations and the appearance of
impropriety. 90 The Code, the Court on the Judiciary, and the Judicial
Ethics Advisory Committee are integral to maintaining the reputation of
the Delaware Judiciary for fairness, impartiality, integrity, and
independence.
183. Id.




188. CODE, supra note 182, at Canon 1.
189. See In re Adoption of Rules of Procedure, slip op. (Del. . 1994),
http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/?DJCJC _101608a.pdf. See Appendix B for a summary
of the Advisory Opinions issued by this committee.
190. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
We believe that an appointed, politically-balanced judiciary insures
judicial independence and instills public confidence. Election of judges
invites conflicts of interest and a perception of bias, and prompts attacks
on judicial independence. We recognize, however, that change in state
judicial selection processes will not happen overnight. In those states
which choose to maintain their system of judicial elections, there are
steps that can be taken to promote and preserve judicial independence,
such as: removing judges from fundraising, lengthening terms,
establishing strong disciplinary counsel, and public education on the
importance of separation of powers and an independent judiciary.
We must work to change the misconception that proponents of
judicial independence do not hold judges accountable for their decisions.
"[J]udicial independence does not mean that the judge is a loose cannon
on the deck of justice, shooting in any direction he or she wishes."l 91 All
public officials, including judges, are accountable, but judges must be
able to exercise their judgment within a framework that allows them to
make decisions without knee-jerk retribution. 192  An independent
judiciary is indispensable and is what retains our status as a free
democracy. We cannot stand by idly and watch it erode. Justice White's
comments in Section VI make clear that there is much we can do to
combat assaults on judicial independence. We urge jurists, lawyers, and
lawmakers to consider these efforts and undertake a committed approach
to promoting and protecting judicial independence.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: AN INTERVIEW WITH JUSTICE PENNY WHITE'93
We recently had the opportunity to speak with Justice White about
her experiences as a Tennessee Supreme Court Justice and the current
state of the judiciary. Justice White shared her thoughts on how to
reinforce an independent judiciary and the Separation of Powers
191. C.J. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4 (2003).
192. See id.
193. The Honorable Penny J. White, former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice, is
presently the Director of the Center for Advocacy and Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Tennessee College of Law. Justice White, who has written extensively on
the subject of judicial independence, graciously granted us an interview on June 16, 2008.
This section memorializes Justice White's opinions on the current state of the judiciary,
and what we can do to ensure that the judiciary preserves its independence. The authors
are very grateful to Justice White for her willingness to speak with us and share her
observations. In addition, the authors thank Justice White for her valuable contributions
as a jurist, scholar and teacher, and to this article.
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Doctrine. According to Justice White, these are "bad times."l 9 4 In the
last decade, respect among the branches of government has eroded. And
as that trend continues, the balance shifts farther away from an
independent judiciary.
Attacks on judicial independence are not new, but they are
becoming more fervent. Justice White attributes the United State
Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White' 9 5
with elevating the detractors' zealous tone. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that candidates for judicial office could announce their views
on disputed legal or political issues.19 6  White created the perfect
environment for interference with the courts, and special interests groups
have seized the opportunity by trying to control those state courts with an
elected judiciary. All the special interest groups need is to find a pliable
soul who wants to be a judge and then get that person elected.
In their attempts to control the judiciary, the most common method
the special interest groups employ is to target judges who do not share
their views. Minorities and women are disproportionately the focus of
such attacks, because they are easier marks. One reason may be the
stereotypical views held for those groups. Women, for example, are
expected to take a "woman's position" in cases involving rape, custody,
or family issues.197
The tone of these attacks is also becoming increasingly vicious. In
a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court election, Justice Louis Butler's
opponent, Judge Michael Gableman, used a Willie Horton-style
campaign ad that juxtaposed a photo of Justice Butler next to a mugshot
of an inmate, who was convicted of rape.19 8 Justice Butler represented
the inmate when he was a public defender.' 9 9  The side-by-side
placement of the images was purposely done to show the men's physical
resemblance. 20 0  Not only did the ad make both photos look like
mugshots but implied to the viewer that Justice Butler is responsible for
the inmate's horrible crimes.2 0'
194. Telephone Interview with Justice White, Director of the Center for Advocacy
and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (June 16,
2008).
195. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
196. See id. at 788.
197. Telephone Interview with Justice White, Director of the Center for Advocacy
and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (June 16,
2008).
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What can we, as a legal community, do to prevent these attacks?
The most obvious way to address the influence of special interests is to
go to the source of their power-money. Ideally, a cap on special
interest group spending would equalize those influences. But, as in
White, any attempts to "suppress" the special interest groups' political
speech would potentially face a First Amendment challenge.
So how can we change the pendulum's swing? Justice White
observed that all too often judicial independence is taken for granted.
Education must be the cornerstone of any effort to reinforce judicial
independence and to curb the special interest groups' influence.
Moreover, education has to start at the earliest levels by teaching school
children at a young age about the doctrine of separation of powers and
the rule of law.
Education is one step. But we must also take these attacks on
judicial independence as an opportunity to go on the offensive and
institute measures that will restore and reinforce the public's confidence
in the judiciary and provide tools so voters can make educated decisions
about the judicial candidates. The public deserves good judges, and
voters should be presented with the best candidates. Some member of
the public, however, will be tempted to vote based on the judicial
candidates' views on certain individual issues. But voters must be
persuaded that they should not elect judicial candidates the same way
they elect legislators. Judges must understand the rule of law.
Accordingly, there are criteria that are better indicators for selecting
judges. Justice White advocated three approaches: (1) judicial
performance evaluations; (2) recusal standards; and (3) judicial conduct
commissions.
A. Judicial Performance Evaluations
For two decades, the ABA has worked on judicial performance
evaluation guidelines that address demeanor, punctuality in written work
and at trial, composure, treatment of parties, knowledge, and articulate
legal rulings. Currently, there are 17 States that use these guidelines.202
Of those states that use judicial performance evaluations, some of them,
such as Colorado, Alabama, New Jersey, and Tennessee, publish the
results on websites, in voter guides, or in newspapers.
202. See National Center for State Courts, Judicial Performance Evaluation (2005),
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/statelinks.asp?id=46&topic=JudPer.
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B. Recusal Standards
Ideally, states should select judges through judicial appointment
systems, not elections. A complete overhaul in most states, however, is
not realistic or practical, because the public has a valid fear of dramatic
change. Justice White used to say that she would be comfortable with a
hybrid system that elects trial judges and appoints appellate judges, but
according to Justice White, the Supreme Court's decision in White203
changed the landscape. But if there must be judicial elections, we have
to institute strong recusal standards. This can be done in two ways:
(1) peremptory challenge or (2) automatic recusal. The peremptory
challenge would operate like a challenge to a juror with one party having
a limited ability to strike a judge. Likewise, an automatic recusal would
require judges to recuse themselves when they have made public
statements about an issue that is later raised in a case. Recusal would be
automatic, not optional.
Justice White noted that the Supreme Court in White also advocated
for recusal standards. "Minnesota may choose to have an elected
judiciary. It may strive to define those characteristics that exemplify
judicial excellence. It may enshrine its definitions in a code of judicial
conduct. It may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process
requires, and censure judges who violate these standards."2 04 Some
doubt, however, that recusal alone can redress the consequences of
White. In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's recusal
remedy as limited and recalled an early decision of the Court that found
that recusal standards may be useful to cure individual bias, but "'no
such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional
partiality."'
20 5
C. Judicial Conduct Commission
Composed of non-lawyers and lawyers, a judicial conduct
commission would evaluate judicial candidates' ads and claims. When
there is a false or derogatory ad, the commission would ask the candidate
to remove the bad ad or to appear before the commission. Although the
commission would not have any binding authority over the candidate,
commissions like these have been effective.
The composition of the commission is also an important
consideration. The members of the commission must be volunteers,
preferably community leaders, and could also include bar association
203. White, 536 U.S. at 765.
204. Id. at 794 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
205. Id. at 802 (quoting Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)).
2009]1 249
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
presidents or retired judges. But the commission must draw-in non-
lawyers, because the public is cynical and may tend to believe that
commission members who are lawyers may use their positions to earn
favors from judges.
There are other means that can be employed to preserve judicial
independence, such as eliminating life tenure for state judges. The ABA
has recommended that judges be elected to one lengthy term, such as a
15-year term. The alternative would be a 2-term system: one short term,
four years, with a judicial performance evaluation at the end of the first
term, followed by a longer term. We can also change the way we talk
about judicial independence, a term that opponents have given a bad
connotation. In response to the negative connotation, the ABA has taken
a Madison Avenue approach by promoting "judicial fairness" and "fair
courts"-not "judicial independence."20 6
Finally, we can go out and talk to the public. Judges, especially
role-model judges, and lawyers have to speak out. Local judges can start
at the grass roots level, by speaking at community groups or at schools.
The Terri Schiavo case, for example, would be a very good tool for
teaching the public about the importance of separation of powers and the
rule of law. As Justice White suggested, "[Schiavo] is an example that
the every day citizen can relate to that demonstrates why we need court
decisions based on law and not political pressure."207 It is the perfect
case to demonstrate the need for checks and balances and the roles of the
courts and the legislature.
Promoting judicial independence, the foundation of democracy, has
to be a life-long project, but it is well-worth the effort.
206. Telephone Interview with Justice White, Director of the Center for Advocacy
and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (June 16,
2008).
207. Id.
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